Attackers who sabotaged refrigeration at about 700 French supermarkets in October entered through controllers that retailers had left reachable from the internet with weak passwords, in a sector the EU's main cybersecurity law leaves to national governments.

Overnight on 11 to 12 October the attackers left defrost cycles running until display cabinets reached 50°C for about six hours. Affected stores threw away fresh and frozen stock, Intermarché lost tens of millions of euros in a day and France's Cyber Crisis Coordination Centre counted at least 15 fires. On 9 November the French government attributed the attack to Shahid Kaveh, a cyber unit of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Norway's Police Security Service and the Polish government have blamed Russia-linked actors for sabotage of a dam in April 2025 and of energy sites in December 2025. A second refrigeration wave hit stores in at least eight more countries on 1 and 2 November and remains unattributed.

Iran's foreign ministry rejected the French accusation as "baseless and one-sided" on 10 November. The Kremlin had denied any role in the refrigeration attacks on 5 November.

Governments and researchers have attributed each incident separately, to Iran in France and to Russia-linked actors in Poland and Norway. The EU, which sanctioned 24 staff of a Russian propaganda agency on 16 November, has linked none of the sabotage to a single campaign.

700 supermarkets on the night of 11 October

Refrigeration controllers run the display cabinets and cold rooms in a supermarket and are often connected to the internet so that contractors can monitor and repair them remotely. Attackers reached Danfoss AK-SM and AK-SC controllers and Dixell xweb devices through their web interfaces, according to the Paris prosecutor. They set defrost cycles, which heat the cooling coils to melt ice, to run without limit and switched off the temperature alarms that would have alerted staff.

Roland Lescure, the finance minister, put the number of affected stores at about 700 of France's 10,000 supermarkets. Intermarché said its affected stores would have to discard all the fresh and frozen products concerned, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimated food losses at several tens of millions of euros. The Paris prosecutor's cybercrime section opened an inquiry on its own initiative on 12 October, citing the fires.

Vincent Strubel, director general of ANSSI, the French national cybersecurity agency, said the Danfoss sites were reached through direct internet connections and weak passwords. Danfoss, the Danish manufacturer of most of the controllers, said the affected stores "were running outdated firmware". Claroty, a security company, had earlier found a hidden login mechanism on the AK-SM 800A that accepted a daily code derived from the date and bypassed the administrator password. Danfoss patched the flaw in August 2025, and investigators have yet to say whether the attackers used it.

Shahid Kaveh and the French attribution

A five-page report from the Cyber Crisis Coordination Centre, which brings together ANSSI, military cyber command and the DGSE and DGSI intelligence services, sets out the basis for the attribution. It cites infrastructure shared with earlier reconnaissance against Schneider Electric industrial equipment, long-running scanning scripts, traces of Farsi and a link to CyberbanNews, an outlet that relayed the attack from 13 October. Investigators found IP addresses linked to devices in Iran.

ANSSI published its account on 9 November and kept the forensic artefacts behind it unpublished, so researchers outside government cannot test the attribution. DomainTools, a threat intelligence company, wrote that the gap leaves operators in other countries unable to check their own systems for the same indicators.

Jean-Noël Barrot, the foreign minister, called it "an attack of unprecedented scale and aggressiveness" and summoned Iran's ambassador. France said it would propose EU sanctions against the Iranian entities and people involved. Laure Beccuau, the Paris prosecutor, transferred the case to investigating judges the same day on charges including organised attacks on automated data systems in the interests of a foreign power, which she named as Iran. Her office is seeking international arrest warrants for the head of Shahid Kaveh and his two deputies, who remain unnamed.

The November wave, still unattributed

Overnight into 2 November, refrigeration settings were changed at stores in Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Ireland, Estonia, Finland, Portugal and Italy. Musgrave withdrew chilled and frozen products from 13 of its 223 SuperValu stores in Ireland, and Carrefour counted 15 of more than 700 stores in Belgium. An ICA store in Sjöbo, in southern Sweden, found fridges and freezers set to 50°C. Three cold-storage sites of the French blood service, the Établissement français du sang, were manipulated. Separate monitoring caught the change before any blood products were lost.

NoName057(16) and Z-Pentest Alliance, two pro-Russian groups, claimed the November wave on 4 November on Telegram and in a video broadcast on Italian television. DomainTools assessed the claim as propaganda unless the groups produce proof, because the video showed nothing beyond what was already public. The Paris prosecutor's cybercrime section said on 10 November that it could find no confirmed link with the October case. The Centre for Cybersecurity Belgium said the perpetrators were unknown and that "it may never be determined".

Heat, power and water

On 29 December 2025, coordinated attacks hit more than 30 Polish wind and solar farms, a manufacturer and a combined heat and power plant supplying almost half a million customers, according to CERT Polska, the national response team. The intruders damaged the firmware of field devices, and the farms lost contact with the grid operator while continuing to generate. At the heat plant they had spent a long period stealing data and privileged accounts. The plant's endpoint security software blocked the wiping malware they launched.

The intruders entered Poland's energy sites through exposed VPN access. ESET, a Slovak security company, attributed the attack to Sandworm, a unit of Russian military intelligence, and Donald Tusk, the Polish prime minister, said the attacks appeared to have been prepared by groups directly linked to Russian services.

On 7 April 2025 intruders opened a floodgate at a dam in Bremanger, western Norway, releasing 500 litres of water a second for four hours before anyone noticed. Norway's Police Security Service blamed pro-Russian cyber actors in August 2025, and the Russian embassy in Oslo called the statement unfounded.

King's College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust confirmed in June 2025 that a delayed blood test result caused by the 2024 ransomware attack on Synnovis, a pathology contractor serving London hospitals, was one of several factors in a patient's death. The criminal group Qilin claimed the attack.

Russian propaganda and an unattributed bot network

Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/2556 lists the Social Design Agency, a Moscow political technology company, as "funded, directed and supervised by the Russian Presidential Administration". The Council's reasons say the agency ran cloned media brands, fake news outlets and staged offline provocations, including operations around the European Parliament elections of June 2024. Entries 82 to 105 name 24 of its employees, among them Andrey Perla, described as its chief ideologue, and the heads of its media and social media departments.

Chay Bowes, an Irish RT correspondent, is also listed. The Council accuses him of amplifying the Russian influence operation known as Storm-1516. A parallel listing covers NoName057(16), which claims denial-of-service attacks on European governments, utilities and election candidates. In all, the Council sanctioned 30 people and two organisations on 16 November.

Alliance4Europe, a Brussels-based non-profit, and Trollrensics, a Dutch analysis company, flagged 8,505 fake X accounts that followed Swedish politicians before the election of 13 September. The researchers attribute the network to no government. Their working hypothesis is a commercial service hired by different clients, run from accounts that X's own location feature places in Benin, Nigeria and South-East Asia.

Each fake account used a Swedish name and a stolen photograph and followed small Swedish accounts in bulk, which raised their follower counts and their reach in X's recommendation system. The researchers started from more than 550 accounts identified before the Dutch election of October 2025, which posted more than 23,000 times and later turned to Hungary before its April 2026 vote. Sweden's Psychological Defence Agency said it saw no large-scale coordinated foreign activity linked to the election.

Matryoshka, an operation that researchers at Alliance4Europe and the Berlin-based Center for Monitoring, Analysis and Strategy attribute to Russian state or state-aligned actors, published fabricated videos carrying the branding of Euronews, AFP and Der Spiegel in August. X declined the researchers' first request to remove them and took them down on 24 August, about six days after the first appeared. Matryoshka's operators remain unidentified.

Why the controllers and accounts were left open

ICA said its affected stores used an outside supplier and sat on a network outside its central network, and the Finnish retailer Kesko said the equipment sat outside its central protections. Selver, in Estonia, said the store that was hit was the last one awaiting a move to a new system. A Danfoss spokesperson said systems in the Netherlands sat on insecure networks and still used default passwords. Danfoss said most units hit in France were AK-SM 800 and AK-SC 355 models it no longer updates.

More than 4,500 Danfoss controller interfaces were reachable from the internet on 12 October, more than half of them in France, according to searches of Shodan, a search engine for internet-connected devices. The NIS2 Directive, the EU's main cybersecurity law for services such as energy, health and transport, covers food businesses engaged in wholesale distribution and industrial production, which leaves supermarkets outside it. The Cyber Resilience Act will oblige manufacturers to supply security updates only for products placed on the market from 11 December 2027, which leaves every controller already installed in a shop outside that duty.

France missed the October 2024 deadline to transpose NIS2. The European Commission referred France to the EU Court of Justice in July 2026, and deputies finished examining the bill on 10 November, more than two years late. The Commission must review NIS2 by 17 October 2027 and, under Article 40, assess whether the sectors it lists remain the right ones.

Alliance4Europe wrote that X took down individual accounts after the network was first flagged in 2024 but that the underlying systemic issues on the platform seemingly remained the same. Fewer than 1 per cent of accounts logged in earlier investigations had been restricted, removed or banned, and the authors called X's enforcement ad hoc and partial. The European Commission opened proceedings against X over information manipulation on 18 December 2023. It fined X €120 million on 5 December 2025 over its blue checkmark, advertising repository and researcher access, and the manipulation part of the case remains open.

Sanctions, warrants and reviews

The EU first sanctioned the Social Design Agency and its founder, Ilya Gambashidze, in July 2023 over the cloned-website operation known as Doppelganger. The Council's own reasons for the new listings describe the agency at work 11 months after that first asset freeze, and the UK had already sanctioned 49 of its employees. Europol's Operation Eastwood took more than 100 NoName057(16) servers offline in July 2025, and the group was claiming attacks again by November 2026.

ENISA, the EU cybersecurity agency, issued a joint statement on 4 November with the Commission, Europol and national response teams urging organisations to cut the exposure of affected systems. Christophe Hansen, the European commissioner for agriculture and food, said the attacks were "a deliberate attempt to disrupt our food supply chain", and the Commission's Security College is reviewing retailers' backup arrangements.

Alliance4Europe called for more decisive and systematic moderation from X. It argued that failing to redesign the systems the network exploits may breach Article 34 of the Digital Services Act, which requires very large online platforms to assess and reduce systemic risks, a finding only the Commission can make.

CERT-FR's instructions to operators

CERT-FR, the French government's emergency response team, told refrigeration operators to cut internet access to the devices, checking their insurance contracts first if that meant cutting the data feed to their contractor. It told them to review the full configuration, including defrost schedules, and to restore access only through a secure VPN, treating firewall filtering of contractor addresses as an emergency stopgap. For Danfoss devices it recommends the Strict security level and new passwords in place of the defaults. Sweden's National Cybersecurity Centre told organisations to list which devices are internet-connected, decide whether each needs to be and keep the rest updated.

The French blood service's separate temperature monitoring and the Polish heat plant's endpoint software were both in place before the attacks and limited the damage. CISA, the U.S. cybersecurity agency, calls FIDO authentication, delivered through passkeys or physical security keys, the only widely available login that resists phishing. The French refrigeration controllers and the Polish VPN gateways were both protected by passwords alone.

What happens when critical infrastructure fails simultaneously?

On 24 February 2022, the morning Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a cyberattack disabled modems on Viasat's KA-SAT satellite network. Customers in Germany, France, Italy, Hungary, Greece and Poland lost service, and Enercon, a German manufacturer, lost remote monitoring and control of 5,800 wind turbines with a combined capacity of 11 gigawatts. The turbines kept generating, but Enercon's service teams were still restoring control weeks later.

Ukraine suffered the first cyberattack known to have cut power to homes on 23 December 2015. Intruders remotely opened breakers at substations belonging to three regional distribution companies, and about 225,000 customers lost electricity for up to six hours, according to a U.S. government account based on interviews with the companies. Engineers restored supply by switching to manual operation.

Spain and Portugal lost their entire continental power systems at 12:33 on 28 April 2025, in a collapse caused by a grid fault. About 60 million people were affected and the outage reached part of south-western France. Phone and internet connections failed, trains stopped with 30,000 to 35,000 passengers on board, cash machines went dark and Portuguese banks and schools closed. Hospitals ran on generators. Spain's official report ruled out a cyberattack and found that the system had failed to control voltage, and ENTSO-E, the association of European grid operators, published its final report on 20 March 2026.

Mobile networks and payment systems on the Iberian Peninsula stopped within hours of the grid, and the interconnector between Catalonia and France disconnected during the collapse. A satellite attack aimed at Ukraine cut control of power plants in Germany. The November refrigeration attacks reached stores in nine countries through equipment from a single supplier. Hospital generators and manual switching kept the Iberian and Ukrainian failures from spreading into wards and homes for longer.

The Viasat, Ukrainian, Iberian and refrigeration incidents each involved one sector or one supplier. A coordinated cyberattack that cut regional power while also disabling backup generators, hospital suppliers or cold-chain monitoring would remove the fallbacks that kept each incident contained. That combination is a scenario assembled from real components, and it has yet to occur in an EU member state.

Some Iberian regions waited up to 16 hours for electricity. Enercon needed weeks to restore control of its turbines. Pathology services at London hospitals hit by the Synnovis attack took months to return to normal.

The European Commission's Preparedness Union Strategy, published on 26 March 2025, told member states that households should be able to manage on their own for 72 hours, on the grounds that the first hours of an extreme disruption matter most. The Critical Entities Resilience Directive, which covers the physical resilience of energy, water, health, transport, food and other providers, required member states to identify their critical entities by 17 July 2026. Those entities then have 10 months to meet its obligations, which places the first full duties in 2027.

Member states were due to write the directive into national law by 17 October 2024, and 24 of them missed the deadline, according to the Commission. The EU's pooled emergency capacity for cyberattacks is the Cybersecurity Reserve created under the Cyber Solidarity Act, which holds €36 million for 2025 to 2027 to buy incident response from private security companies during large-scale attacks. ENISA, which runs it, had an annual budget of €26.9 million in 2025.

Outages documented in Europe and Ukraine have lasted from hours to months, each in one sector at a time and contained by fallbacks that stayed intact. Household guidance stops at 72 hours, binding resilience duties for critical entities begin in 2027 and the shared cyber reserve is smaller than the budget of the agency running it. Neither an attack of that kind nor an outage of that length has been recorded in the EU. How long European governments could keep power, water, hospitals and food supply running under a prolonged, coordinated attack on several sectors is a question the documented incidents leave open.

France's resilience bill transposes both NIS2 and the critical entities directive. The Senate adopted its version on 12 March 2025. The National Assembly is due to hold its formal vote on 17 November, after questions to the government, and a joint committee of both chambers must then reconcile the two texts before the bill can become law.