President Donald Trump signed an executive order on the evening of Friday 16 October 2026 waiving the tariffs and most of the mandatory sanctions in the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, two days before the law required him to apply them. The Senate passed the Act 86 to 11 on 7 August and the House of Representatives agreed to it 262 to 159 on 16 September. Trump signed it on 18 September.
Section 4(d) of the order keeps the waivers in force until the President or the Secretary of State, consulting the Secretary of the Treasury and the US Trade Representative, determines "that further action is appropriate." The order sets no end date and the Act sets no limit on how long a waiver can last.
Trump announced on 9 October, after a telephone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin, that Russia would supply diesel to US and global markets. The Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued General License 135 the same day, authorising transactions in Russian-origin diesel, including imports into the United States, until 12:01 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time on 7 April 2027. The Treasury said it acted at Trump's direction.
Trump told reporters the next day that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy "better damn well stop" attacking Russian oil refineries, and said Ukraine needed a new president. A US official told Axios that Trump agreed the diesel deal after Zelenskyy ignored about six US requests to halt those strikes.
Senators Jeanne Shaheen and Richard Blumenthal led a letter from 12 senators, six of them Republicans, on 13 October asking Trump to rescind the diesel licence and enforce the Act. On 15 October, 22 House members, five of them Republicans, asked for the licence to be revoked and for "full and faithful" implementation of the law. Trump issued the waivers the following evening.
General License 135 purports to authorise imports of Russian diesel despite a separate statutory prohibition enacted in 2022, the Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act, raising unresolved questions about the Treasury's legal authority. The 16 October waivers do not touch that statute. The 2022 law allows the ban to end only after the president makes specified certifications concerning Russia's withdrawal from Ukraine and other statutory conditions, consults Congress at least 45 days in advance and waits 90 days, during which Congress can disapprove. No such certification has been reported. Lawyers and lawmakers disagree on whether OFAC can license imports the statute bans, and no court has ruled.
Although no Russian diesel shipment to the United States has been confirmed, General License 135 also authorises transactions involving Russian diesel sold into international markets. Its potential economic effects therefore extend beyond US imports, even as the legality of bringing Russian diesel into American ports remains disputed.
Russia has made no documented concession on its invasion of Ukraine in exchange for the diesel arrangement or the waivers. The White House has given no public explanation for the waivers beyond the order's statement that they are in the national interest, and the report the Act required Trump to send Congress explaining that judgement has not been published.
What the order suspended and what remains in force
New mandatory sanctions and tariffs created by the Graham Act are suspended. Sections 102 to 111 required the President to sanction named Russian officials, oligarchs, state banks, state companies and shadow fleet operators and to impose bans on transfers, securities, investment and energy dealings. Sections 112 and 113 required new duties on Russian goods and on major buyers of Russian energy. The order waives all of the duties and the sanctions in sections 102(a), 102(e) and 103 to 111.
Existing sanctions imposed by executive orders under the Russia national emergency declared in Executive Order 14024 in April 2021, which Trump continued on 24 March 2026, remain in force. That emergency underpins most of the sanctions imposed since the 2022 invasion, including the import, investment and services bans in Executive Orders 14066, 14068 and 14071. Section 4(b) of the order states that it does not affect those measures or the people already designated under them. Rosneft, Lukoil, Gazprom Neft, Surgutneftegas, Sberbank and the other entities already on US sanctions lists stay blocked.
Section 102(d) of the Act had written the sanctions under that emergency into statute for the first time and required them to "remain in effect" as they stood the day before enactment. Section 4(b) waives that requirement. On the text of the Act, ending one of those codified sanctions would have required, under section 117, a peace certification and a 30-day period in which Congress could block it. With section 102(d) waived, the sanctions under Executive Order 14024 and the orders issued under its emergency continue, but they rest on executive authority that the President can amend or license around without that statutory review.
Section 222 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017, codified at 22 U.S.C. 9522, wrote into law the 2014 Ukraine-related Executive Orders 13660, 13661, 13662 and 13685 and the cyber-related Executive Orders 13694 and 13757. Sanctions under those orders have their own statutory footing and are unaffected by the waiver. Under 22 U.S.C. 9511, the President must report to Congress before terminating those sanctions, waiving them for a specific person or taking a licensing action that significantly alters US policy toward Russia, and cannot act during a 30-day review period in which Congress can pass a joint resolution of disapproval. Sanctions under the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 and the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 are covered by the same review. The 2022 import ban carries its own certification and review procedure.
Treasury licences sit outside the Act's mandatory scheme. Section 114(h) of the Act preserves the Treasury's power to issue general licences, and no congressional review applies to them under the Act. General License 135 for Russian diesel and General License 128D, which the Treasury extended on 15 October to let Lukoil service stations outside Russia, including in the United States, keep operating until 24 April 2027, were issued under that power.
Nothing in the Graham Act or the order bars the administration from licensing further transactions or easing sanctions under Executive Order 14024 and its related orders without a vote in Congress. Certain sanctions imposed under earlier legislation remain subject to separate congressional review requirements. Under 22 U.S.C. § 9511, qualifying sanctions-relief measures, including licensing decisions that significantly alter US policy toward Russia, may require advance congressional review. General License 135 authorises diesel transactions under both 31 CFR part 587, which implements the 2021 and 2022 orders, and part 589, which implements the 2014 Ukraine-related orders and statutes covered by 9511. Scott R. Anderson wrote in Lawfare on 15 October that prior notice to Congress under 9511 may have been required. Whether the licence significantly alters US policy toward Russia, which would trigger the review, is unsettled, no 9511 report on it has been made public and no official has addressed the question.
The provisions Trump waived
Section 102 of the Act required the President, within 30 days and every 180 days after, to review and sanction a list of people and vessels. The list includes Russia's president, prime minister, defence minister and chief of the general staff, the heads of the SVR, FSB and GRU intelligence services, oligarchs who have not opposed the war and the leaders of the Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG projects. It also covers shadow fleet tankers used to evade sanctions or the oil price cap and their owners, operators, insurers and senior crew. Foreign ports that serve those tankers are covered too.
Section 103 required at least two sanctions on the Central Bank of Russia and full sanctions on Sberbank, VTB, Gazprombank and other state-owned banks within 30 days. It exposed foreign banks doing significant business with them to sanctions and barred US persons from dealing with them from 18 October.
Sections 104 to 110 required a review and blocking of other Russian state-owned or affiliated companies, a ban on US banks and brokers processing transfers for the Russian government, a Securities and Exchange Commission ban on trading Russian state-linked securities, a ban on new US investment in Russia, a ban on new US investment in Russia's energy sector and on US energy exports to it, a ban on buying Russian sovereign debt and sanctions on financial messaging providers used to evade the Act. Section 108 also required sanctions on foreign persons who knowingly support Russian oil, gas, uranium or coal production for sanctioned persons.
Section 111 required the President to enforce the existing ban on Russian enriched uranium and, from a later date, to sanction the leadership of Rosatom, the state nuclear corporation.
Section 112 required duties of up to 500 per cent on all goods from Russia, including oil, gas and coal, within 30 days. Section 113 required duties of up to 100 per cent on all goods from any of the five largest importers of Russian crude oil or natural gas in the 12 months before enactment that knowingly made new purchases on or after 18 October 2026, and on the five countries that did most to help Russia evade oil sanctions. A country that took less than 15 per cent of Russia's gas exports and has significantly cut its purchases is exempt from the gas trigger. The Act contains no equivalent exemption for crude oil.
The Act's 30-day deadline fell on 18 October. Without the waivers, Trump would have had to sanction the officials, banks and shadow fleet operators named in the Act by that date and impose the duties in sections 112 and 113. The bans on US dealings with Russia's state banks, on government fund transfers, on new investment in Russia and on investment in its energy sector would have taken effect the same day.
Section 2 of the order formally raises the duty on Russian goods by 500 per cent and sets 100 per cent duties on goods from the top five importers of Russian crude and gas and the top five facilitators of sanctions evasion. Section 4(a) then waives every duty under sections 112 and 113. The order names no country. Section 4(c) waives sections 102(a), 102(e) and 103 to 111, along with section 117, which sets the conditions for terminating sanctions under the Act. The order does not explain why section 117 appears in the list.
Section 114, which sets humanitarian, agricultural, medical and civil nuclear exceptions and preserves the Treasury's licensing power, is not waived. Section 201, the Iran Sanctions Act extension, cannot be waived under section 115.
Section 3 of the order directs the US Trade Representative to monitor purchases of Russian crude oil and natural gas and sanctions evasion, and to inform the President promptly of any circumstance that might require further action, including on the waivers. Section 113(e) requires the Trade Representative to redetermine the top five importers every 180 days.
Waiver and termination
Section 115 lets the President waive any sanction, restriction or duty in the Act after sending Congress a written certification that the waiver is in the national interest and a report explaining the basis for it. The report must be unclassified and may carry a classified annex. Covington & Burling wrote that the Act places no limit on how long a waiver lasts. Sullivan & Cromwell, Covington and Paul Weiss describe no congressional review procedure for waivers.
Section 117 sets a much higher bar for ending sanctions outright. To terminate a measure against Russia or a Russian person, the President must certify that Russia has signed a peace agreement accepted by Ukraine's government and has ceased hostilities. The termination cannot take effect for 30 days, during which Congress can block it through an expedited joint resolution of disapproval. A waiver under section 115 suspends the same measures without that certification and without that review. Waiving section 117 does not, however, eliminate independent restrictions imposed under earlier sanctions legislation, including the congressional review requirements applicable to certain measures under the 2017 law.
Section 4(d) of the order gives the President or the Secretary of State the power to end the waivers. The 9511 review covers sanctions under the 2017 and 2014 laws and does not list the Graham Act, and section 115 contains no review procedure of its own. No published legal analysis reviewed identifies another statutory mechanism that would let Congress reverse a section 115 waiver, which leaves new legislation as the only binding route identified so far, which requires the President's signature or a two-thirds vote in both chambers to override a veto. The House vote of 262 to 159 on 16 September fell short of two-thirds. The Act's Russia provisions expire five years after enactment, in September 2031, under section 203 of the enacted text, more than two and a half years after Trump's term ends on 20 January 2029. A later president could revoke the waivers.
The diesel licence and the 2022 import ban
Section 2 of the Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act, Public Law 117-109, provides that Russian products in chapter 27 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule, which covers diesel, "shall be banned from importation into the United States." The ban applies "in a manner consistent with any implementation actions issued under Executive Order 14066," the March 2022 order that first barred Russian oil imports. The statute contains no national-interest waiver and no licensing power.
Section 3 allows the President to end the ban only by certifying that Russia has agreed to withdraw its forces and cease hostilities in a deal accepted by Ukraine's government, that it poses no immediate military threat to any NATO member and that it recognises Ukrainians' right to choose their government. The President must consult the House Ways and Means and Foreign Affairs committees and the Senate Finance and Foreign Relations committees at least 45 days before certifying, with a written report. Termination takes effect 90 days later unless Congress passes a joint resolution of disapproval.
General License 135 cites only two sets of Treasury regulations, 31 CFR part 587 and part 589. It does not mention Executive Order 14066, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act or the 2022 statute. Executive Order 14066 delegated to the Treasury the use of the President's powers under that Act, and OFAC has issued earlier licences under part 587 authorising imports the order banned, including General License 16 on 8 March 2022.
No presidential certification under section 3 has been reported. Seven senators from both parties said in a joint statement on 11 October that the administration had not consulted Congress as the statute requires and that the deal "runs directly counter to that law." The certification and report Trump sent Congress on 16 October were made under section 115 of the Graham Act, a separate statute.
Representative Lloyd Doggett of Texas, who sponsored the 2022 law in the House, said on 12 October: "Now Trump is directly violating that law." Republican Senator Thom Tillis told NBC's Meet the Press on 11 October that "there's a legitimate case for saying the president's not following the law." Kristen Eichensehr of Harvard Law School told TIME that the statute's conditions for ending the ban had not been met: "none of those things have happened, and that's the main restriction in the law."
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told Fox News on 11 October: "We're going to do it with all the legal authorities we have." He said anyone claiming the Graham Act prohibited the deal was wrong but did not name the authority for the import licence. A Treasury official told TIME the licence complied with all applicable laws. No Treasury or White House legal memorandum on the question has been published.
Anderson wrote on 15 October that the administration's strongest argument rests on the clause tying the ban to implementation actions under Executive Order 14066, which could be read to let later OFAC licences shape the ban. He wrote that this reading would in effect restore an item-by-item waiver that was dropped from the House version of the bill and would leave the section 3 termination process with little purpose. He described the position as arguable, but "it's far from clear that it would prevail in federal court."
Rachel Alpert, a former OFAC chief counsel now at Jenner & Block, said on a Lawfare podcast the same day that she expected OFAC lawyers to rely on reading "implementation actions" to include licences. Peter Harrell of Georgetown University, a former National Security Council official, said on the same programme that the clause preserved only the licences in force when the law passed. A George Washington University law professor told TIME the administration could argue that a licence is a suspension and not a termination. Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer wrote that the licence does not expressly address the 2022 statute, and Clyde & Co wrote that it may be subject to legal challenge.
Anderson wrote that criminal penalties for unlawful imports under 18 U.S.C. 545 can be pardoned, but that civil penalties and vessel forfeiture under 19 U.S.C. 1595a cannot and may be pursued for five years after an import. He also wrote that the licence is unlikely to produce an actual increase in US imports. The Lawfare panel discussed a possible challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act by refiners or renewable diesel producers and said standing would be a hurdle.
No lawsuit had been filed and no court had ruled by 17 October. No confirmed import of Russian diesel into the United States had been reported. Whether the licence conflicts with the 2022 statute is a disputed legal question, and no violation has been established by any court or official body.
Section 115 of the Graham Act reaches only Graham Act provisions, and the order does not mention the 2022 statute, diesel or General License 135. Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer wrote that the Graham Act preserves the Treasury's licensing power but does not amend or suspend the 2022 ban. Anderson wrote that the Graham Act defines crude oil by tariff heading 2709, which excludes diesel.
The diesel agreement
Trump wrote on Truth Social on 9 October that Russia would immediately supply more than 300,000 tonnes of diesel, 500,000 tonnes in November and 1,000,000 tonnes after that. He said a further 3,000,000 tonnes could follow depending on the condition of Russian refineries. The firm tranches total 1.8 million tonnes and the full figure, including the conditional tranche, 4.8 million tonnes. Putin's office said the call lasted about 90 minutes.
General License 135, signed by OFAC director Bradley T. Smith, authorises all transactions otherwise prohibited under 31 CFR parts 587 and 589 that relate to the sale, delivery, offloading and importation of Russian-origin diesel. It bars any debit to accounts at US financial institutions held by the Central Bank of Russia, the National Wealth Fund or the Ministry of Finance. It does not name any producer, buyer, trader or vessel and does not mention the Specially Designated Nationals list. OFAC has not said whether it covers dealings with designated Russian oil companies.
Russia had banned diesel exports by producers from July 2026 after Ukrainian drone strikes cut refinery output, and extended the ban to 31 October. The Russian government lifted it on 10 October for 500,000 tonnes. Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said on 12 October that exports could reach three million to 3.5 million tonnes a month by the end of the year. He said on 14 October that no contract had yet been signed and on 15 October that first deliveries to the United States were possible in two to three weeks.
A tanker carrying about 40,000 tonnes of ultra-low sulphur diesel loaded at the Baltic port of Primorsk for Morocco on 13 October, Reuters reported using LSEG ship-tracking data. Putin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on 15 October that Russian diesel was reaching world markets and the United States directly. No customs record or tanker-tracking report confirming a Russian diesel cargo bound for a US port had been published by 17 October. The Minerva Zen, reported by some outlets as carrying Russian diesel to Wilmington, North Carolina, left St Petersburg before the deal and was carrying liquid fertiliser for EuroChem North America, according to TankerTrackers. France 24 published a debunk on 16 October.
Kirill Dmitriev, Putin's special envoy for investment and head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund, said on 14 October that the first contracts with US buyers would be signed within days. He said on 16 October that the Treasury had asked his fund to help resolve payment problems in the diesel trade. OFAC has blocked the fund and Dmitriev since February 2022. The Treasury has not confirmed or denied the request, and OFAC has not said whether the licence covers dealings with the fund.
Novak called the diesel deal a positive signal for the Russian economy on 14 October. On 16 October he said there were no obstacles to the exports given that sanctions had been lifted for six months, according to the Russian outlet VZGLYAD. Dmitriev told the Russian Energy Week forum in Moscow the same day that the Graham Act hindered Russian-US projects. After the waivers he called the suspension "a truly historic moment," Reuters reported.
Trump envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner told Ukrainian negotiators in Miami, before the Trump-Putin call, that Trump expected to lift sanctions on Russian diesel, Axios reported. Reuters reported on 12 October, as cited by the Council on Foreign Relations, that US officials hoped the deal would soften Russia's position in peace talks. A planned trip to Moscow by Witkoff and Kushner was put on hold indefinitely, The New York Times reported on 13 October. No document published by 17 October shows that General License 135 and the waivers were drafted together, and the administration did not mention the coming waivers when it issued the licence.
Following the money
Reuters valued the first 300,000 tonnes at about $400 million, a gross sale value. ICE low-sulphur gasoil futures, the European diesel benchmark, traded at $1,419.50 a tonne on 12 October, according to Reuters. At that price, 300,000 tonnes is worth about $426 million, the 1.8 million firm tonnes about $2.56 billion and the full 4.8 million tonnes, including the conditional 3,000,000, about $6.81 billion. These are gross sale values before freight, discounts and costs. They are paid to the selling companies, and the conditional tranche may never be delivered. The Carnegie Endowment's Sergey Vakulenko put the gross value at about $7 billion for roughly five million tonnes over six months.
Russia exported about 817,000 barrels a day of diesel in 2025, according to Kpler. Vortexa data put exports at about 850,000 barrels a day in the first quarter of 2026, 690,000 in the second and 190,000 in the third, after Ukrainian strikes and the export ban. Tatiana Mitrova, an energy researcher, told The Moscow Times the diesel "would have gone to the global market anyway." The International Energy Agency said in October that Russian exports were limited by a lack of working refinery capacity. Vakulenko wrote on 13 October that most of the diesel would have been exported anyway and estimated Russia's best-case real gain at $30 to $40 a tonne, from better prices and access to buyers, which he described as tens of millions of dollars a month. Applying his per-tonne range, a YAC News calculation, gives $54 million to $72 million on the firm 1.8 million tonnes and $144 million to $192 million if the conditional 3,000,000 tonnes is also delivered. Vakulenko's own estimate assumed about five million tonnes over six months to April 2027, so these figures are projections and not realised revenue.
Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said on 13 October that no export duty applies to diesel and that the budget would receive revenue only through tax on company profits. Russia set export duties on crude and oil products to zero from 1 January 2024. Alexander Kolyandr of Eurasia Group estimated the arrangement would add about $100 million to the federal budget, as distinct from company revenue, according to reports of his comments to the Financial Times. The period the estimate covers is unclear. Newsweek reported it as covering the first six months, while United24, citing the same Financial Times report, tied it to exports of three million tonnes a month. YAC News could not review the Financial Times original, and the figure should be read as an order of magnitude.
Russia's budget also pays refiners a subsidy known as the damper to hold down domestic fuel prices when export prices are high. Damper payments reached a 2026 record of 305.5 billion roubles in September, according to Finance Ministry data compiled by The Moscow Times. Vakulenko wrote that lower world diesel prices would reduce those payments, which would benefit the budget.
No published data shows that the arrangement has yet produced measurable additional revenue for Russian companies or the Russian state. No contract has been reported signed with a US buyer.
Oil and gas revenue was planned at 22 per cent of Russia's 2026 federal budget revenue, according to the Polish Centre for Eastern Studies. Russia's oil and gas revenue fell 17.2 per cent in the first nine months of 2026 to 5.47 trillion roubles. The 2026 budget allocates 12.9 trillion roubles to defence. Russia's federal deficit reached 5.2 trillion roubles in the first nine months, according to Finance Ministry data reported by Trading Economics. No source reviewed traces revenue from the diesel licence to specific military spending.
Who benefits
Russian diesel producers can sell under General License 135, but no seller has been named. Rosneft and Lukoil have been under US blocking sanctions since 22 October 2025, and Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas since 10 January 2025. Those four companies are among Russia's largest oil producers and refiners. The licence authorises all transactions under parts 587 and 589 that relate to Russian diesel, which on its face reaches dealings that would otherwise be barred with such companies, but OFAC has not confirmed that reading. TASS reported on 10 October that Russian oil companies would sign contracts with foreign buyers in coordination with the Russian government. No trader, shipowner, insurer or bank has been identified as taking part.
Russian state banks avoid new mandatory sanctions. Section 103 would have required full sanctions on Sberbank, VTB and Gazprombank and at least two sanctions on the Central Bank of Russia, and would have exposed foreign banks dealing with them. Those banks remain subject to the sanctions already imposed under executive orders. What the waiver removes is the additional statutory layer, including the secondary exposure of foreign banks and the ban on US persons dealing with the state banks from 18 October. No published estimate quantifies the effect.
Shadow fleet operators avoid mandatory designation. Sanctioned shadow fleet tankers carried 57 per cent of Russia's seaborne oil in September 2026 and 67 per cent of its crude, according to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), which estimated Russia's total fossil fuel export revenue at about €625 million a day that month. Section 102 required the President to review and sanction shadow fleet vessels and their owners, operators, insurers and senior crew, along with foreign ports serving them, within 30 days and every 180 days after. Vessels and companies already designated stay designated. No published estimate shows how many further vessels would have been designated.
Foreign buyers of Russian energy avoid the section 113 duties. The executive order does not name the countries covered. Senate aides named China, India, Slovakia, Hungary and Azerbaijan in July as the five largest crude buyers and China, France, Japan, Hungary and Belgium as the leading gas buyers, according to Squire Patton Boggs, which described the list as indicative. Other assessments place Turkey among the top crude importers. China bought €9.1 billion of Russian fossil fuels in September 2026, India €4.1 billion, the European Union €1.7 billion and Turkey €1.0 billion, according to CREA.
US goods imports from China were $308.7 billion in 2025, from India $103.8 billion and from Turkey $16.4 billion, according to the US Trade Representative's office. Goods from any of those countries would have been exposed to a duty of up to 100 per cent only if the country was formally listed and kept buying Russian crude or gas from 18 October. The rate could have been set anywhere above zero. The gas exemption could not shield India, whose exposure is through crude. Relief from these potential duties is relief from future penalties and does not remove any existing sanction.
Pressure on Ukraine
What the record shows
OFAC issued General License 135 on 9 October at Trump's direction. Trump told reporters on 10 October that Zelenskyy "better damn well stop" hitting Russian refineries and blamed the strikes for straining global diesel supply. "I think it's time for Ukraine to get a new President," Trump said the same day.
Trump wrote on Truth Social on 11 October that Russia and Ukraine had agreed an energy ceasefire. A White House official told Axios it covered refineries on both sides, with power plants and grids possibly to follow. Zelenskyy told Axios the announcement was news to him and later said Ukraine was awaiting details from the US side. Russian forces struck Kharkiv's CHP-5 power plant within hours. Peskov said on 14 October that the ceasefire had never been specified and that Russia could not be accused of breaking it.
White House spokeswoman Taylor Rogers said in a statement to Newsweek on 16 October that Ukraine and Russia should stop striking refineries. "Lowering prices for America's great farmers, truckers, and families remains a top priority," she said.
Zelenskyy told the Financial Times on 14 October that Ukraine was "done" with the truce and would resume refinery strikes. Ukrainian drones hit a refinery in Russia's Ryazan region on 15 October, a senior Ukrainian official confirmed to the Associated Press. Asked in a Newsmax interview that aired on 15 October about the renewed strikes, Trump said: "Well, I think that's a disgrace." In the same interview he described Zelenskyy as more difficult to deal with than Putin. Trump waived the Graham Act sanctions the following evening.
What has been reported
A US official told Axios that Trump agreed the diesel deal after Zelenskyy ignored about six requests to stop the refinery strikes. A Ukrainian official told Axios that Witkoff and Kushner threatened in Miami to cut off intelligence if the strikes continued, and the US official denied any threat. European officials told the Financial Times that US representatives warned the PURL scheme, under which European governments buy US weapons for Ukraine, could be suspended unless the strikes ended. Semafor reported on 14 October, citing one administration official, that cutting off intelligence had been discussed without agreement.
Zelenskyy said Russian ballistic missiles struck Kyiv on 12 October and Kyiv's Darnytsia CHP-4 power plant on 13 October without the usual warning from partners. Colonel Yurii Ihnat, the Air Force spokesperson, said there was no warning before the first barrage on 13 October but that warnings arrived before three later barrages that night. Trump told CBS News on 13 October that the United States had not stopped sharing intelligence. CBS sources said the warnings may have been withheld intentionally, while US officials blamed bad weather.
Starlink and Starshield terminals used by Ukrainian forces were capped at about 160 kilometres an hour from the night of 13 to 14 October, according to Serhii Beskrestnov, Zelenskyy's adviser on defence technology. Starshield is the military service the Defense Department buys for Ukraine so that its fastest drones, including interceptors used against Russia's jet-powered Shaheds, can stay connected. Ukraine's 7th Air Assault Corps said units lost drone links for 10 to 20 seconds at 110 to 120 km/h, and Beskrestnov said several missions failed. Zelenskyy said on 16 October that the previous speed limits had not returned.
Two US officials and a Western official told Reuters on 15 October that the order to restrict the service came from inside the White House. A senior US official told Reuters that Trump made no such request. The Telegraph reported on 16 October, citing four sources, that Elon Musk proposed the restriction and that Trump agreed, the last point resting on one source. Musk wrote on X that limits on Starshield are decided by the US military and ultimately the president. Trump said on 16 October he did not think he or Musk was responsible. The Defense Department declined to discuss the cap and SpaceX did not comment. Nine senators from both parties asked the Defense Department inspector general to investigate.
Beskrestnov wrote that the timing could not be a coincidence, but offered no evidence linking the cap to the refinery dispute or the diesel deal, and none of the sources cited by Reuters or The Telegraph has made that link.
What remains unresolved
No source reviewed shows that Russia's diesel supply depended on Ukrainian restraint, that Ukraine agreed to any limit on its strikes beyond the brief pause, that Russia offered a reciprocal concession on Ukrainian energy sites or that the waivers formed part of an undisclosed agreement with Russia. Whether the intelligence gaps and the Starshield cap were decisions aimed at the refinery strikes is unestablished.
Congress and the waiver
Congress wrote section 115 to allow national-interest waivers without a time limit or a review vote, and wrote section 117 to subject outright termination to a peace certification and a 30-day disapproval procedure. Trump used the first route. Exercising the waiver is lawful under the Act on its face.
Gregory Meeks of New York, the senior Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, told the House Rules Committee on 15 September, before the final vote, that there were no safeguards around the waiver. Don Beyer, a Virginia Democrat and the senior Democrat on the Joint Economic Committee, warned on 5 October that the Act gave the president very broad authority to ignore most of its provisions. Semafor reported the same day that US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer would not commit to imposing the sanctions Congress had enacted.
Blumenthal and Shaheen, a New Hampshire Democrat, published the 13 October Senate letter. Its Democratic signatories were Blumenthal, Shaheen, Dick Durbin, Sheldon Whitehouse, Jack Reed and Chris Coons. Its Republican signatories were Thom Tillis, Susan Collins, Alan Armstrong, Lisa Murkowski, Mitch McConnell and John Cornyn. The senators wrote that the diesel deal "is a gift to our adversary and a betrayal of our Allies" and asked Trump to rescind General License 135 and use the Graham Act's authorities.
Jim Costa of California and Michael McCaul of Texas led the 15 October House letter to Trump, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Bessent. McCaul, Brian Fitzpatrick, Don Bacon, Joe Wilson and Dan Newhouse were its Republican signatories. The letter asked the administration to revoke the licence, issue no further general licences reopening Russian energy trade and designate Russian officials, banks, state enterprises and shadow fleet operators under the Act. It asked whether any provision would be delayed or waived and requested written answers by 18 October.
Blumenthal wrote on X after the order that the waivers "have nothing to do with our national security." Bacon, a Nebraska Republican, wrote on X: "The President is prolonging the war, not ending it." Senator Elizabeth Warren said Trump had ignored the instruction from Congress to increase pressure on Russia, according to a report of her comments to The New York Times.
Beyer wrote on X on 16 October that Trump had waived all the sanctions on Russia and accused him of surrendering to Putin. "Trump has proven he will twist this law and abuse the powers it conferred on him," Beyer wrote. He called the law flawed and urged Congress to change it.
Meeks introduced H.R. 10828 on 15 October with 14 Democratic cosponsors and no Republicans. Its text has not been published. Fitzpatrick announced on 10 October a bill to block all purchases of Russian oil, to be forced to a vote by discharge petition, but it had not appeared in congressional records by 16 October.
No public statement on the waivers from Senate Armed Services Committee chair Roger Wicker, Speaker Mike Johnson or Senate Majority Leader John Thune had been found by 17 October, and no Republican leader had announced a plan to challenge them.
Committees can request the section 115 report, hold hearings and issue subpoenas, which can bring the administration's reasoning into the open but cannot end a waiver. No review procedure applies to section 115 waivers, so a new law is the only binding route identified to end them or limit future ones, and it needs the President's signature or a two-thirds vote in both chambers. The 9511 review remains available for any relief from the sanctions codified in 2017 and 2014, and the 2022 statute's procedure for any termination of the import ban. The House is in recess until 9 November, after the elections. The 119th Congress ends on 3 January 2027 and every pending bill, including H.R. 10828, expires with it. No court has ruled on the waivers or General License 135, and no lawsuit has been filed.
The national-interest report
The order states that Trump submitted the section 115 certification and a report explaining its basis to Congress. Neither document had been published by 17 October, according to RFE/RL, ABC News and Fox Business, and the White House had not publicly detailed its reasoning, RFE/RL reported. The sources reviewed do not say which committees received the report or whether any member has described its contents.
Section 115(b)(3) requires the report to be unclassified, although it may include a classified annex. An unclassified report can be released by the committees that hold it or by the administration without declassification.
Max Meizlish of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies said the open question was "what substantive justification the administration provided Congress." No member of Congress had formally requested the report's release by 17 October in the sources reviewed.
Lawmakers had not been told before 16 October whether Trump would impose the measures or waive them, The Irish Times reported. Unnamed sources told RFE/RL that the administration missed an 8 October deadline to send Congress the written justification section 113(g) requires at least 10 days before any duty is imposed. The White House has not commented on that account. The order itself does not refer to fuel prices, the US war with Iran, the midterm elections, peace negotiations or the consequences for Ukraine.
Fuel prices and the midterms
Trump said the diesel arrangement would lower fuel prices. US retail diesel averaged $6.179 a gallon in the week of 12 October, according to Energy Information Administration data reported by FleetOwner, after a record $6.529 on 21 September. Fuel prices have climbed during the US war with Iran. The midterm elections are on 3 November, and Republicans hold narrow majorities in both chambers.
The full 4.8 million tonnes equals about 35.8 million barrels at 7.45 barrels a tonne. US distillate demand averaged 3.77 million barrels a day in the four weeks to 2 October, according to EIA data, so the full volume would cover about nine and a half days of US consumption. Goldman Sachs estimated the October and November volumes would cut wholesale diesel prices by $1 to $2 a barrel. Isabelle Gilks of Wood Mackenzie said the volumes would have a very limited effect on US retail prices.
No administration official has publicly linked the 16 October waivers to fuel prices or the elections. No economic adviser has been reported recommending them.
International response
Guo Jiakun, a spokesperson for China's Foreign Ministry, said on 17 September: "China consistently opposes long-arm jurisdiction that lacks a basis in international law." India's Foreign Ministry said before the waiver that it had conveyed its concerns about the legislation to the US government, ANI reported. Neither government had commented on the waiver itself by 17 October in the sources reviewed.
European Union and UK bans on imports of Russian refined products, in force since 5 February 2023, remain in place. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said on 10 October that suspending sanctions on Russian diesel gives Russia more revenue to wage war. She said the right course was to "pressure the aggressor to stop the war, not the victim to surrender," the Associated Press reported.
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha wrote on X on 9 October: "Weakening sanctions neither brings peace closer nor helps global markets." Zelenskyy said in Brussels on 16 October that Ukraine could not accept the diesel agreements, that gas deals would follow and that sanctions on other goods would be lifted after that.
The law's history
Lindsey Graham, the South Carolina Republican who introduced the original Sanctioning Russia Act with Connecticut Democrat Richard Blumenthal on 1 April 2025, died on 11 July 2026 at 71. Congress renamed the bill in his memory and passed a revised version within weeks. The enacted law, Public Law 119-111, made many existing sanctions on Russia mandatory, added new ones and extended the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 to 2031.
Darline Graham, his sister, was appointed to serve out his term and is running for the seat with Trump's endorsement. In a debate with Democratic nominee Annie Andrews in Columbia this week she said she was proud to have helped pass the Act. "It gives the president tools that he can use, if he so chooses," she said.
What Congress approved and what took effect
Existing US sanctions against Russia remain in force, but the additional penalties Congress approved will not take effect while Trump's waivers remain in place. The administration has not publicly disclosed the detailed national-interest justification it submitted to Congress, and Russia has made no documented concession on its invasion of Ukraine in exchange for the diesel arrangement or the sanctions relief.
Russian officials, state banks, energy companies and sanctions-evasion networks face fewer additional US restrictions than Congress voted for. The Trump administration has meanwhile authorised renewed Russian diesel transactions, under a licence whose legal basis against the 2022 import ban is disputed, and Trump has demanded that Ukraine stop attacking the refineries producing that fuel. Who profits from the diesel trade and from the suspended penalties, and by how much, remains incompletely documented.
Congress approved the Graham Act by 86 votes to 11 in the Senate and 262 to 159 in the House to increase economic pressure on Russia. Trump used the law's own waiver provision 28 days after signing it to prevent its principal new enforcement measures from taking effect, with no date on which they must be reconsidered.
